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"When evil meets thee, search thine own heart" – 
Confucius. 
 
 
Context 
 
Praxis movement1 was recently thematised anew in a series of publications,2 
and several projects were initiated with the purpose of preserving its cultural 
value.3 However, the new discourse on Praxists produced a series of assess-
ments that were atypical in comparison to virtually all previous reviews. Gajo 
Petrović and Milan Kangrga – spirituum movens of praxis philosophy – were 
dominantly criticized, unlike previously, when they were often glorified. As-
sessments concluded that theories developed by Praxists were logically incon-
sistent and that their errors were "covered up" by too abstract, confusing con-
cepts that lacked proper articulation in respect to social reality. More so, that 
their philosophical investigations neither had nor will have any useful appli-
cation in our society.4 
In 2015, Lino Veljak proposed that comments on praxis philosophy belong 
to any of the two major categories: (1) criticism (misses the point of source 
material), and (2) critique (builds upon the source material). Veljak then ar-
ranged commentaries into three distinct categories: (1) civil-conservative type 
 
1
  In research papers written by Praxists, the term "praxis" is often implied as being related 
to Aristotle's term. This often creates confusion, especially in Slavic languages. Kangrga 
explained that Aristotle's term, denoting a moral relation to other individuals in the polis, 
the "code of conduct", differs from the notion of praxis as used in a more contemporary 
way, but not entirely (cf. Kangrga 2008: 24, 42, 53-54; cf. Arist. NE. 1104a-1107a; cf. 
Ackrill 1978: 595). Also, in relation to Aristotle's concept from Nicomachean Ethics, we 
should not confuse it with similar, but clearly different notion of praxis as it is used in 
Aristotle's Poetics (cf. Belfiore 1983: 110-111). 
2
  For example: Labus 2017; Lunić 2017; Mikulić/Žitko 2015; Kalebić 2014; Veljak 2014; 
Olujić/Stojaković 2012; Jakšić 2012. 
3
  For example, the development of Praxis online archive. Available at: 
https://praxis.memoryoftheworld.org/ (accessed on June 20, 2018). 
4
  Cf. e.g. Žitko 2015; Sućeska 2012. 
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criticism/critique that argues against any socially/politically involved philo-
sophical endeavours; (2) diamat-abandonment type criticism/critique that ar-
gues (i) against a departure from "authentic" Stalinist-Leninist conception of 
dialectic materialism; (ii) against replacement with abstract humanism; and 
(3) economistic type criticism/critique that argues against praxis philosophy as 
a sway-away from political economy (cf. Veljak 2015: 50-54). In comparison 
to the recently published comments on praxis philosophy, the proposed typol-
ogy can be applied only to a certain extent (e.g. they criticized abstract hu-
manism, but did not endorse diamat) because their arguments, I propose, be-
long to cringe type criticism, oriented towards a complete disvaluation of ob-
ject under inspection. 
Upon the examination of these arguments, I concluded that contemporary 
criticists either misunderstood or misrepresented Praxists. Thus, I offer coun-
terarguments in favour of praxis philosophy as a well thought out philosophi-
cal endeavour.5 In the following chapters, I analyse the misways of cringe type 
criticism "embodied" by the recent discussions regarding praxis philosophy, 
and I simultaneously offer a critical outline of the internal structure of praxis 
philosophy, thus far absent from studies. 
 
 
1. (Un)groundlessness: Contorted views on metaphysics 
 
With materialism as the governing principle, dialectics as the governing mech-
anism of change, and the revolution as a teleological finality,6 Marx's "new 
thought" does not really differ from many traditional metaphysical systems 
(cf. Löwith 1983: 53-55), which was something that Praxists were quick to 
notice. However, most contemporary criticists asserted that Praxists deterio-
rated Marx’s theory by interpreting his later work through philosophical (met-
aphysical) lenses of early Marx. Marx's abandonment of philosophy motivated 
the proposal of this argument in his development from Die Deutsche Ideologie 
to Das Kapital.7 Be that as it may, for Praxists the only significant thing that 
 
5
  I developed my arguments following Milan Kangrga's and Gajo Petrović's research be-
cause (1) they were the key figures in praxis philosophy, and (2) they were the most cited 
philosophers in the papers criticizing Praxists. 
6
  Either in a broader sense as the change in social formation or a narrow sense as the event 
of a violent shift, thus both (cf. Schaff 1973: 264). 
7
  Marx's conclusions from that particular period echo as symptomatic criticism of praxis 
philosophy which claims that Petrović and Kangrga had their thinking framework 
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happened in Marx's disciplinary shift was that he merely switched from one 
metaphysical system to another. It was because they found Marx's lack of 
awareness regarding this occurrence troublesome. Thus Praxists were accused 
of reverting to metaphysics which Marx abandoned, yet it was precisely that 
which motivated Praxists to rethink Marx's theory. The case is that Praxists 
abhorred traditional metaphysics, especially Kangrga, because in their inter-
pretation such systems signified the unchangeable world, and thus they argued 
that even though Marx may have abandoned philosophy, fundamentally speak-
ing, metaphysics did not leave him. From Praxists' perspective, Marx’s thought 
perpetuated an enclosed system with particularly rigid metaphysics producing 
mono-perspective societies and was thus meant to be altered.8 I believe that 
criticists did not grasp that fact. Consider what Alen Sućeska wrote in objec-
tion to Praxists' claim that Das Kapital was written to provide a critique re-
garding (our) historical world that needs to be changed radically: 
 
"[...] the essence of Marxism is not only in signifying positive possibilities 
of existing reality that it already contains within itself, but foremost in un-
derstanding and in conceptual grasping of the structural mechanism of re-
ality, that which prevents the fulfilment of these possibilities, that is, which 
prevents a revolution and a realization of classless society" (Sućeska 2012: 
142-143). 
 
Sućeska claims that this was the primary reason why Marx wrote Das Kapital. 
Praxis philosophers would say that precisely such a reason prevents the hap-
pening of revolution. If the possibilities are already within the reality, then they 
are void. Praxists would argue that already, these possibilities are governed by 
an enclosed Is-System (Sein-System) with clear mechanisms of content control 
and pre-generated limits to possibilities. The reality Sućeska speaks of – this 
reality – is a world in which, in fact, a proper revolution did not occur before 
Marx, and it did not happen even 170 years after Marx, and the problem is that 
it will never happen unless the approach to reality is radically going to be chal-
 
bounded by the specific production of the academic field. More precisely that their ig-
norant disposition toward political economy caused them to lose proper tools for the 
envisioned emancipation (cf. for example Jurak 2015). 
8
  E.g., Marx and Marxists exposed the problem of alienation – and dealienation did not 
happen; they explained class struggle – and it did not cease to be; they revealed the 
mechanism of commodity fetishism – and embraced it as a principle; they set into motion 
socialist revolutionary movements, establishing capitalism and nationalism. 
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lenged. "Radically" does not mean methodically revealing all of the mecha-
nisms operating on the fundamental level of reality. Instead, it means aborting 
the reality altogether, including the method and its governing principles. 
Praxists reinterpreted Marx to save his project from utter failure conceptu-
ally, to keep it from turning into a massive production of endless analyses of 
What-is, typed down onto paper without ever provoking the act of change.9 
Sućeska attempted to nullify this argument by claiming that Praxists faithfully 
used concepts from German idealism, and thus somehow retrograded Marx's 
theory by obscuring the problem. Quite the opposite, Praxists intentionally re-
turned to former ideas because they concluded that it is the only way to ad-
vance Marx's project. What Praxists aimed for was to sew classical German 
idealism back into Marx’s method and theory, because otherwise – for them – 
it would be impossible to understand (1) how to conceptualize a way of "break-
ing out" of the state of alienation, and (2) why the world revolution did not yet 
occur. Idealism, which Marx characterized to be a sort of isolated thought, safe 
from or unaware of reality, was used by Praxists to subvert Marx by pointing 
out that such thought is only isolated because it is free. They "opened the door" 
which Marx "sealed" with his metaphysics, and they did so by integrating ar-
guments from Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Heidegger. 
Firstly, they concluded that Heideggerian Dasein is the one "who" creates 
and seizes possibilities (Petrović). Secondly, and not less importantly, they ex-
posed the pointlessness of "ground", of "base". They nullified the concept of a 
base that defined the outcomes, and thus they annihilated Marx's underlying 
causal system along with it (Kangrga). More specifically, they used Kant's 
concept of a priori, and Fichte's concept of tathandlung to reconceptualize 
practical reason operating in the revolution, and then they used Schelling's and 
Hegel's idea of grounding governed by the groundless first principle to con-
ceptualize a framework that allows Dasein to fulfill itself. Most notably draw-
ing from Böhme, Schelling argued in Philosophische Untersuchungen über 
das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit for the objective Ungrund,10 while Hegel 
 
9
  For example, praxis philosophers use Fichtean Lehre instead of Wissenschaft to prevent 
scientific reductionism that they correlate and sometimes identify with metaphysical sys-
tems. Criticists confused this intentional swap for Praxists' lack of understanding of 
Marx, landing comments that make no sense. An example of such mislead criticists is 
Nikola Cerovac (cf. Cerovac 2015: 134). 
10
  "We have already explained what we assume in the first respect: there must be a being 
before all ground and before all that exists, thus generally before any duality – how can 
we call it anything other than the original ground or the non-ground [Ungrund]?" (cf. 
Schelling 2006: 68, OA 497-499). 
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"erased" the subjective boundaries imposed upon such a concept with the fa-
mous "pure Being and pure Nothing are, therefore, the same" in his Wissen-
schaft der Logik. For example: (Hegel 2004: 88, § 134). Thus Kangrga explic-
itly wrote: 
 
"Contrary to the traditional metaphysical position which begins with a kind 
of ground, here it is about groundlessness of a modern human, and his 
world, which means that it always starts over from itself on his own, as a 
possibility and openness for everything" (Kangrga 1984: 86).11 
 
It is a painful irony that many of the criticists negate metaphysics only to use 
metaphysically-founded propositions against Praxists who were, in fact, criti-
cal of metaphysics altogether.12 They claim that Praxists "swamped into 
Marx’s early works", and "ended on the diametrically opposite side of vulgar 
materialists" (Sućeska 2012: 143), or that they "in reading Thesen accentuate 
their speculative nature by ignoring inherently present materialistic presuppo-
sitions within them" (Cerovac 2015: 128), or that they were somehow "enclos-
ing into disciplinary boundaries" (Žitko 2015: 153), while they, in fact, wanted 
to offer a framework of thinking that does exactly the opposite. They did not 
"ignore" anything; they modified it to make a break with metaphysical sys-
tems. The goal was to overcome Marx's metaphysical errors to propose a more 
plausible theory of de-alienation. 
In the following chapter, I will address the problem of alienation which 
constitutes the second structural point in the movement of Praxis thought. 
 
 
2. Alienation: The Is (Sein) – Ought (Sollen) Lemma 
 
The concept of (materialistic) grounding forced Praxists to consider that the 
alienation phenomenon is rooted deep within the world – in the "ground" of 
whatever does constitute the world. Where there is such thing as "ground", 
 
11
  This problem is explored in a "dialogue" with Schelling (cf. Schelling 2006: 9-10, SW 
336–337/OA 401–403). 
12
  An example of Petrović and Kangrga’s awareness of this entire problem is Petrović’s 
remark that Engels should be blamed for popularizing the interpretation of Marx as a 
political economist, rather than a philosopher (see Petrović 1986a: 295). For a clear ar-
ticulation of the necessity to transcend Marx cf. Petrović, 1986a: 303-304. 
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there is a seed of alienation. The "alienation", as understood by Praxis philos-
ophers, in its essence refers to the humankind’s departure from the possibility 
of coming to be with oneself, with its humane essence – that of being free. 
 
"Alienation comes from the very human’s way of producing and reproduc-
ing its own life, and it encloses the totality of its relations to the world 
already produced in" (Kangrga 1989a: 18-19). 
 
This, however, is majorly not comprehended by the recent criticists. For ex-
ample, Cerovac built an entire idea of "Kangrgian aporia" upon this misinter-
pretation. While asking (with Kangrga) "if German philosophers uncovered 
the identity of theory and practice, how can the human being be incapable of 
changing the world?", Cerovac wonders how "for some reason, history, reality, 
society (...) caused to alienate man from himself" (Cerovac 2015: 130), only 
to succumb to the critique of philosophy as being unable to change the world. 
However, Kangrga already offered an answer: When human beings behave in 
accordance to the Sein, they alienate. The schism is developed as a difference 
between nature (corresponding to Sein), and world (corresponding to Sollen), 
with the former being "given" or "rendered", further described as a "self-
growth of life conditions" (Kangrga 1984: 12), while the latter being "pro-
duced" (Kangrga 2010: 353) by human beings. Contrary to Cerovac's superfi-
cial analysis, the world continually does change in degrees because of the hu-
man being's internal drive explained through the phenomenon of Sollen. 
 
"Not a single individual human life is satisfied and can be satisfied by 
knowing that the life as such is that which is, rather it wants to, in any 
possible way, realizes itself as a concrete, meaningful life" (Kangrga 
1989a: 160).13 
 
But what is yet to happen is the radical change, and Praxists, much like Plato, 
believed that philosophers ought to play a significant role in it (cf. Plat. Rep. 
5.473d). Praxists argued that any world with any predefined ground neces-
sarily "seals away" the essence of humankind, and turns the world into the 
extension of nature, rather than into its opposition.14 As Bloch stated: that 
 
13
  Let us immediately define how Kangrga understands meaning: "actively open human 
possibility, an open process of self-articulation through work" (Kangrga 1989a: 161). 
14
  "For evil is surely nothing other than the primal ground [Urgrund] of existence to the 
extent this ground strives toward actuality in created beings and therefore is in fact only 
the higher potency of the ground active in nature" (Schelling 2006: 44, OA 457-460). 
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which is, cannot be true. Praxis philosophers had to return to the point from 
which Marx departed, even though they said that "he too" thought of it.15 Pre-
cisely because of that, Kangrga concluded that "human being and its world are 
possible as a shift (Schub) from being" (Kangrga 1989a: 16). The problem, as 
they proposed it, is the following: how to transcend the fissure between Sein 
(Is) and Sollen (Ought)? 
To Praxists it did not seem logical that human beings are entirely depend-
ent on material conditions, and that they produce the world on the simple basis 
of economic reality (or given life conditions). Such existential situation would 
describe the general situation of the world Praxists lived in (or: were in), but 
it would not account for the totality of world as a human extension. The case 
motivated Kangrga and Petrović to study Kant and Fichte who, as Praxists 
claim, realized the real potency of a human mind.16 Finally, this brings us to 
the crucial anchor of praxis philosophy: the 'I' of the human being, the self of 
human being as being a human. Praxists concluded that the only way humanity 
might reach the point of revolution is if the revolution occurs in the human 
being as such and not through a political economy, or scientific studies, or by 
guns and torches. First and foremost, it would happen by stopping the gallop-
ing world in its course, and returning to freedom of the self, the freedom to 
seek the defining power human being possesses: creation by seizing the 
(im)possibility.17 According to Petrović and Kangrga's interpretation of Marx, 
it shows by itself that the essence of human being is, in fact, the (Historical) 
(im)possibility (Petrović 1986a: 99). In contrast, alienation 
 
"[...] invades in the very possibility of a human being becoming the human 
being and human world becoming human world, which means that it oc-
curs in the very ‘ground' of that world, and is not some outer emersion, an 
empirical fact, sociological category or even psychological state, that is, 
plain 'anomaly'" (Kangrga 1989a: 18). 
 
 
15
  "Marx's understanding of human being can never remain just an understanding. To un-
derstand a human being would mean to understand what human being already was. A 
human being is not only what it was, before everything, but it is also what it ought to be" 
(Petrović 1986a: 95). 
16
  "And isn't the revolution thinking thought closer to the great philosophies of the past, 
rather than to pseudo-neutral scholar disciplines that in highly specialized manner deal 
with the apology of the existing?" (Petrović 1986a: 262). 
17
  Kangrga defined freedom as the possibility of change rooted in "the ground" (see 
Kangrga 1989b: 199-200). 
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The quote most clearly exposes the problem with continuous analytical "con-
ceptual grasping of the structural mechanism of reality", as Sućeska tried to 
explain. In other words, for whichever (irrelevant) reason once in the past al-
ienation began,18 the solution is not in the structural analysis of society since 
society is already alienated at its core, fundamentally, as being qua being. The 
solution to the problem of alienation lies in human being's ability to act by 
reshaping Sein in accordance with her outmost (im)possibility. It is the rein-
terpretation/expansion of the initial Kantian-Fichtean "creation of object". The 
drive for Sollen alters human being's view regarding the world, and by it ena-
bles human beings to “pour out” the world anew. Petrović and Kangrga dis-
cussed the conditions for such endeavour. Consider Petrović’s detection of 
Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical consideration: 
 
"And so in 'De mundi sensibilis' [...] Kant discerned between theoretical 
research [...] focused on ‘what belongs to being’ [...] and practical consid-
eration focused on ‘what should be inherent to it by freedom’. [...] in Cri-
tique of Pure Reason discerns between [...] ‘theoretische Erkenntnis’ [...] 
Was da ist [...] and [...] ‘praktische Erkenntnis’ [...] Was da sein soll [...]" 
(Petrović 1986a: 287-288). 
 
In this context, Kantian theoretical research aims to identify the structure and 
content of what-is, however, drawing out a specific category of freedom either 
suggests that there is the part of being which is different, independent from 
what belongs to it, or that something such as freedom extends into the possible, 
a certain phenomenon of creation which is by becoming or, perhaps, yet to 
become. Consider how Kangrga draws the creation of world out from Kant’s 
discussion: 
 
"When Kant in his 'transcendental deduction' speaks about a link, that is 
about tying [...] he claims that with such subject’s agency, which is already 
 
18
  Petrović has examined this in respect to Marx and Heidegger. One of the reasons why 
he studied Heidegger was to figure out whether alienation occurs on a daily basis, how 
authenticity plays a role in the history of alienation, is alienation present in a certain 
epoch or was a human being alienated since the very beginning. Cf. Petrović 1986a: 99-
102. Žitko, for example, misses this crucial aspect when he proclaims that "embedding 
alienation into inter history of philosophy creates a tendency to occasionally use the term 
in transhistorical sense without paying attention to the concrete socio-economic condi-
tions under which alienation as a phenomenon occurs" (Žitko 2015: 152). It foremostly 
misses in the sense that Petrović's theory of alienation intentionally rejects this reduc-
tionist view of alienation. 
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thought as a practical act, not only does he create through creative imagi-
nation an object of experience and the experience itself, but with this he 
produces and renders possible a whole new world that, via this agency, yet 
comes to be for the first time" (Kangrga 1984: 21). 
 
Whether this implication is purely speculative or not when it comes to Kant, 
it is Kangrga who adopts the position to revealed the way in which non-being 
constitutes what-is. Non-being is important for the understanding of freedom 
and creation because something such as non-being provides the answer to the 
question how it is possible that we are what we are yet to become. Epistemo-
logically elusive nature of the existence of that which yet isn’t but nonetheless 
is can be deconstructed via non-being. Kangrga does not speak of non-being 
directly, but it is fittingly describable by the following: 
 
"That 'Ought to' therefore points to that which still isn’t in the very 'Is', it 
wakes it from the stillness, draws out from the darkness of staleness and 
inertia, and pulls it into process of History, which means that it opens a 
dimension of its own possibility according to which the factual 'Is' realizes 
itself as something real, that is, gains a certain ‘meaning’ in the whole of 
this process" (Kangrga 1970: 34). 
 
However, the critical point is that it has to happen within human beings as 
beings. If one is free, then the possibility is not predefined. Then, the possibil-
ity is outside the Being. Čović pinpointed this change of perspective: 
 
"In the unity of Sein and Sollen, Kangrga found Archimedean point from 
which it is possible to move Sein from the ground of alienation and incor-
porate it into an authentic human world. Such point is not possible to fix 
into the sphere of Sein, nor into the sphere of Sollen, but it must by neces-
sity find itself in the extended line of moral oughtness – in the transcend-
able field [...] overgrowing into a dimension of future, the Historical time" 
(Čović 2004: 676). 
 
Non-being is the form of negation of Being, however it is not Nothing, rather, 
the notion encompasses all the possible manifestable that, unless eternalism is 
true, is a part of the fabric of reality precisely in the sense of appearing as if it 
isn’t. In comparison, consider Kangrga’s explanation of the radical notion of 
human historical creation: 
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"It is this nail and this wheel that is the human future already, for it comes 
out of negating that which is simply rendered, executed from the outlook 
of what isn’t or wasn’t yet, because in the abstract being or nature no such 
thing as a nail or a wheel exists, only in active-critical-meaningful negation 
of nature as a purposeful-human opening, grounding and discovering the 
eminent facts of the world" (Kangrga 1989a: 87). 
 
Sein is the source of alienation in the world, and human beings became the 
alienators themselves. Much like Marx or Heidegger, Praxists assumed that, 
rather than just being a condition of some (current) epoch to come to an end, 
alienation might have occurred since the early beginning of humankind or, 
perhaps, it is possible that alienation is what fundamentally grounds a human 
being-in-becoming until, through Sollen, arises from within to fulfil its es-
sence.19 Kangrga wrote that humankind is 
 
"by its essence an ever progressive and revolutionary because it aims at 
changing the world, and because it transforms into action a specific human 
ferment of dissatisfaction with itself and others" (Kangrga 1989a: 160). 
 
However, a human being is never ever merely rendered (given, provided by 
Sein) (Kangrga 1989a: 85) because in human beings Sein comes into conflict 
with specifically human aspect we understand as Sollen.20 We cannot merely 
be. "In as much as what it is [human being], it is the being of History, it does 
not 'have' History [...] it is History itself or Historical happening" (Petrović 
1986a: 17), yet from alienated human beings pours out the alienated world 
(Kangrga 1989a: 17-19). "Somewhere here", in being chained to alienation 
until an unbearable dissatisfaction, occurs the Historical thinking, the for-
mation of crucial (im)possibility that then need to be seized in order to create 
an authentic human world. 
 
 
19
  Petrović wrote, quoting Marx: "By 'allowing' discussion regarding general human na-
ture, Marx in Das Kapital critiques bourgeois society precisely because in it this general 
human nature cannot express itself, because in it ‘a general and a banker play a great 
role, and human being as a human being, on the contrary, only very bland.'"  
20
  Sein is governed by deterministic mechanism, while is governed by indeterministic 
mechanism governs Sollen. It will be explicated in the fourth chapter of this paper, "Will-
ing the question". Cf. Petrović, 1986a: 83-85, to see how our words for human beings 
represent a being that rises free from the ground, signifying the struggle between Sein 
and Sollen. 
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"The onlook of possibility is the onlook of future, the onlook of freedom. 
Namely, only that which can be different than it is, and was, 'has' the future, 
finds itself in it, and can be free, and out of all the creatures that are human" 
(Kangrga 1970: 15).21 
 
Given the fact that the book was published nearly half a century ago, new 
findings, of course, may object to the idea that only human beings have such 
a power. But that is far from being important and we should not hang onto it. 
The important piece of Kangrga’s argument is the existence of freedom in the 
region of non-being, especially because it is where freedom and alienation 
meet – the following is the crucial moment of this struggle: 
 
"Namely, alienation cannot even be noticed in the horizon of alienation, 
rather, only when one comes out from it, and therefore, primarily aliena-
tion is not even an empirical fact or a datum, but it is an engaged and 
meaningful overstepping of empiric as a factical alienated renderness or 
existing positivity" (Kangrga 1970: 16).22 
 
What Praxists had to account for was the problem of how – with what – does 
a human being puncture the thick mass of alienated world? How does one rise 
to revolution? Praxis philosophers proposed the phenomenon of willing as a 
probable solution to the problem. Explaining how thinking is another demon-
stration of the willing (Kangrga 1989a: 27), Kangrga defines life as: 
 
"Nothing other than the will to overstep the boundaries of human possibil-
ities, which means acting from stimuli coming from the origin of the hu-
man world and true human nature, therefore means knowing to be oriented 
towards the future as a criterion for the present" (Kangrga, 1989a: 88; cf. 
Petrović 1986b: 87). 
 
Yet neither thinking itself nor willing itself initiates a change. It is merely a 
medium for human emancipation. Thus, Kant: The phenomenon which begins 
transcension is the phenomenon of spontaneity. 
 
 
21
  Note that in this discussion, Kangrga mentions a single assumption under which all this 
could even be possible. It derives from the indeterministic principle: "If in the ground of 
the human world a possibility that it is what it lacks presence, then the new world of 
today and tomorrow has no chance to be."   
22
  See also p. 15, where Kangrga concluded that the essence of entire History is Aufhebung. 
Luka Perusic 184
"Under spontaneity, Kant understands the possibility to initiate a new or-
der, a series of actions or events in the world of the I, which means a crea-
tive practical act which – in absolute break from the so-called causality of 
nature – opens the area of possibility of one eminently human happening, 
now in the world of freedom, or in Kant’s terms – by the principle causality 
of freedom" (Kangrga 1989b: 20).23 
 
This factually existing phenomenon now provides us with the answer about 
how and why it becomes possible to make a shift from Sein. We will find the 
answer a page later in Kangrga’s enquiry: 
 
"That Being (the ‘Is’) is present in everything, before any statement is 
made, and here begins, historically speaking, not some ‘blunder’, but the 
true scene of the drama of human being and his world, somehow never 
getting to the right source, to the authentic origin, Historical root of our-
selves, therefore: to our self, to self-agency and self-creation, to that Kant-
ian-Fichtean ‘I think’ as self-consciousness and self-operation, to the ab-
solute creational beginning of everything that is, or on that Hegelian His-
torical Nothing which destroys every metaphysics as onto-theo-logy" 
(Kangrga, 1989b: 21).24 
 
On the one hand, "in the human mind the question is ever implied", more pre-
cisely the question "why the existing is such as it is, rather than being differ-
ent?" (Kangrga 1989a: 35). On the other hand, Kangrga already sees the an-
swer, and we too can observe it in a child’s act of wanting to grab the moon, a 
spontaneous act that signifies willing the question,25 opening and revealing of 
the human world in which something relevant for the human being will occur 
(Kangrga 1989a: 29). This micro-manifestation is, in an analogy, a seed of 
revolution, and the image of a child reaching for the moon indeed strikes us 
significantly, but it requires not just any type of freedom or creative drive. 
Instead, within it lies a strong will to guide others: 
 
"Free is only that self-defining action in which a human being works as a 
whole, multiple personality, in which it is not a slave to any particular 
 
23
  The ascension from Plato's cave should be the prime analogy that helps us to understand 
this process. 
24
  See also p. 210 for Fichte. 
25
  "Being is cancelled the moment I posed a question regarding the meaning of being be-
cause that question alone already pulls being into the History" (Kangrga, 1989b: 22). 
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thought, or a feeling, or aspiration. [...] a human being is free only when 
that which is creative within it defines its work, which is, when with its 
work it expands the boundaries of humanity" (Petrović 1986a: 147). 
  
The process reveals an ontological structure of relations between being and 
being-yet/non-yet-being/being-to-be, between what is (being) and what can be 
(the part of non-being). Its crowning moment is the practical act of deciding, 
possible only because Sein does not govern the spontaneity (cf. Kangrga 
1989b: 63). 
The transition from theoretical to practical is in a decision, a "postulate for 
establishing the world", since the world "never really exists by default, the 
world isn’t, the world yet needs to be in order to be!" (Kangrga, 1989b:57, 58), 
which presupposes the ever-utopian projection, the power to be on a standpoint 
of nothing, and nowhere, from which the false structures arise evidently on the 
back of alienated human being, and human beings undertake the revolutionary 
action through radical critique. Contrary to criticists, who superficially 
thought of Praxists' use of utopia as an empty wailing for the phantasmal idea, 
the concept of utopia has a very concrete technical purpose in Praxists' theory. 
Thus, the mapping completes and we identify the essence of human being as 
praxis: 
 
"In the notion of praxis, human social reality reveals itself as an opposition 
to giveness/renderness, that is, as a formation, and at the same time the 
specific human form of being (Sein) [...] praxis is revealing secrets of hu-
man being as an onto-creational being, as a being which is creating a (hu-
man social) reality, and thus understands (human and outer) reality (reality 
in its totality). Praxis is the unity of human being and the world of subjects 
and objects, spirit and matter, products and productivity, a unity that re-
duces historically [...] praxis as a creation of human reality is at the same 
time a process in which earth and cosmos reveal themselves as being" (Pe-
trović 1986b: 305-306) 
 
Such a conclusion is strongly influenced by Heidegger’s investigations. Re-
gardless, it is my belief that Petrović further explored it enough for the possi-
bility to conclude that his contribution to the problem of praxis is authentic. 
Elsewhere, Petrović overlaps with Kangrga: 
 
"As a being of praxis, the human being is a free and creative being, and as 
such it is a being of revolution. Revolution is not some special occurrence 
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in history, but the most concrete form of collective human creativity" (Pe-
trović 1965: 87). 
 
From this, thinking (the) revolution26 occurs as a necessity (Petrović), while 
Kangrga introduces us to the "pinnacle of the human being" – speculative 
thought – meant in the tradition of German idealism.27 It is the moment in 
praxis philosophy which can be understood as the beginning of the revolution-
ary praxis, a battle that, before anything happens, must occur in the human 
being as ontological being, the penultimate creation as the core aligning of the 
human being and its essence (Petrović 1986b: 261). Nonetheless, criticists will 
still insist that Praxists' concept of revolution is confusing, mysterious, tauto-
logical, dubious or strange. In the following chapter, I provided arguments 
against that claim. 
 
 
3. Being Praxis 
 
Most recent criticists claim that Praxists' ideas may serve as a guiding signpost, 
but nothing more. For example, Bogdanić wrote that "in it there is nothing, or 
very little, about how to organize a campaign for such society in capitalist 
conditions" (Bogdanić 2015: 43); Jurak wrote "it's critique remained abstract 
and speculative", sort of "useful, but insufficient", a "positivity as plain nega-
tivity" (Jurak 2015: 72); Cerovac wrote "but in order not to remain at thinking 
the utopia, one most show that a more just society is possible, otherwise we 
remain at the ground of normative ethics limited to a political praxis" (Cerovac 
2015: 137); Sućeska thought that Praxists criticized only an idea of the struc-
ture they were living in, and wrote that "their philosophical-speculative 
thrownness into the future is severely disappointing", and that they were not 
aware of the perpetuation in production, which Marx realized, ultimately turn-
ing into a "wanting demand" with no real strength (Sućeska 2012: 136, cf. 139-
142), which is something that made Sućeska wonder "just what kind of revo-
lution would this 'praxis' revolution be?" (Sućeska 2012: 144). The question 
motivated Sućeska to conclude that praxis philosophy was "barely anything 
more than hypertrophic speculative humanism with Marxist harbringing"; 
 
26
  The meaning is intentionally threefold: (1) "thinking about the revolution"; (2) "revolu-
tionary thinking"; and (3) "revolution that thinks". 
27
  More precisely, in the tradition of Fichte, by his understanding of Ego as not being a 
pure act, but being a pure action, a spontaneous act of creativity. Cf. Drews 1897: 62; 
Fischer 2017: 430. 
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while Žitko writes that Petrović’s "synthetic work" failed miserably (Žitko 
2015: 143, 144), that Petrović’s authentic revolution is, in fact, a "circle of 
pseudo-argumentation" (Žitko 2015: 149-150), that praxis philosophy split 
with reality, and, ultimately, that it didn't work neither on theoretical level nor 
in practical reality where it doesn't offer any "research plan", and has, along 
with the rest of Marxism, declined by the 1990’s (Žitko 2015: 157-159). It 
comes down to Marx’s critical conclusion in Die Deutsche Ideologie – being 
praxis was a fantasy that succumbed to reality, and turned into a footnote in 
the history of philosophy. This, however, is cringe criticism at its best, mani-
fested as an egregious lack of knowledge regarding praxis philosophy. 
The major objection to Praxists was that they, unlike Marx, failed to ad-
dress the actual reality and the structural co-existence of individuals and soci-
ety. Such evaluation, however, signifies criticists' floundering about in praxis 
philosophy which results in constructing contra arguments on completely mis-
placed grounds. Praxists did not develop "a research plan", "a program" or "a 
campaign" because they considered such approach to be utterly pointless. It 
does not matter what kind or program, plan or campaign one might devise 
because such an approach to solving social discrepancies remain in the domain 
of an alienated world. In other words, you cannot possibly have a meaningful 
"research plan", "a program" or "a campaign" if you do not understand how 
the situation fundamentally came to be. To be most exact: you cannot possibly 
have a meaningful strategy because you are yet the original creation of the 
world, the History. In order to do that, one has to understand the ontological 
and phenomenal structure prior to the formation of any historical, social, po-
litical etc. situation. This is the reason why Praxists are not economical politi-
cians or sociologists or any other positive disciplinarians, that is, the reason 
why they are first and foremost philosophers – because only in the domain of 
philosophical re-articulation of the most fundamental structure of reality can 
we find guiding answers to creating a framework of being within which then 
something such as "a campaign" might make sense. Claiming that Praxists 
were terrible thinkers on revolution because they had no concrete plan about 
carrying it out is analogous to claiming that Ernest Rutherford was a lousy 
physicist because he did not devise a social strategy program on carrying out 
the theory of atomic disintegration. Before such a thing can be applied, we 
need to understand the fundamentals that allow for such a thing to be used. 
The difference between Praxists and Rutherford is that Praxists dealt with the 
essence of human beings, and thus with adequately understanding what might 
provoke the radical change. They concluded that there would be no revolution 
unless we rethink the concept, and they returned to German idealism and early 
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Marx to re-study a fundamental theory of revolution in an attempt to under-
stand why it will not begin. As far as Praxists' are concerned, the answers these 
recent criticists are looking for, and the way in which they are looking for it, 
only confirm the alienated reality they are never going to overcome. 
 
"A new society is created with revolution, and a new society cultivates a 
new human being. The later then appears as a passive product of a new 
society, and at the end, a product of revolution. However, who creates the 
revolution? If the real human being is the old one, how can revolution bring 
us a new human being?" (Petrović 1986a: 83). 
 
Žitko argued that praxis philosophy lacks (concrete) critique of capitalism (cf. 
Žitko 2015: 153), while Sućeska concluded that it is simply (too) abstract (cf. 
Sućeska 2012: 139). From a wider angle, the conclusions imply that dealing 
with the analysis of structures requires the development of programs that can 
either lead to a revolution or, once the revolution occurs, will establish the 
'proper order' of free humanity. In both cases, that is, in all of them, Petrović 
is the one who asks: Who creates the program? 
If we want it to succeed, the creator has to be a new type of human being. 
Otherwise we will fail – just like we already failed many times before. No 
individuals, groups or entire nations will ever step into the revolutionary pro-
cess before they change their own ways on the level of human being as human 
being. The society cannot perform a change because it is not a hive mind, and 
because it is not free. Only a human being as such, an individual, in a tangible 
epoch of dynamic events in which aligns with other human beings can do that, 
and it is by no means articulated with outside conditions or societal changes, 
it is, to its full extent, dependent on what Kangrga called "human fact" – un-
predictable and groundless phenomenon from which may, or may not, sponta-
neously come to a difference by acting free – acting outside "a program", "a 
campaign", "a plan". Consider: 
 
"Radical change of society, which cancels all forms of exploitation, cannot 
be carried out solely by changing social structures. Changing social struc-
tures is not possible without changing a human being" (Petrović 1986b: 
76).28 
 
 
28
  Cf. 88, where Petrović mentions Stalinism as an example for the idea of the general rule 
of society. 
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However, the most important aspect of the only way for the human world to 
truly change, that is, to truly achieve its authenticity from freedom, is by not 
being violent. This condition, terribly overlooked far too often, is what many 
of the followers of revolution or the praxis movement either supress or fail to 
learn. It is absolutely impossible to achieve a meaningful world with methods 
that never brought a substantial change to the world, that never but temporarily 
established conditions of fulfilled life of human species. On this matter, Pe-
trović is exact: 
 
"The essence of revolution is not in bloodshed and cruelty, but in creative 
work with which one births and develops a new human being and a new 
society" (Petrović 1986b: 87). 
 
The entire idea of Praxis philosophy was to go precisely against what these 
criticists claim that they should have done instead of what they did. For exam-
ple, it is not true that Petrović and Kangrga didn’t know what to do with the 
critique they developed, as criticists claim. They knew very well what to do 
with it, and have extensively written about it in detail. Among many such in-
dications is the following: 
 
"In order to avoid confusion, I accentuate: the critique most certainly aims 
at changing the world, and showing a direction or path of this change. But 
it would be wrong to think that essential critique in any sphere must end in 
concrete suggestions" (Petrović 1986a: 386). 
 
The case is not that they don’t know what to suggest. The case is that they 
don't think it bears any necessity. It carries no such thing because valid critique 
– if it is true – is already by default altering the Sein of the alienated world (or 
will be altering), and it will have its place in the revolutionary process when 
the critique of the world aligns to a change. Precisely because of that, Praxists 
realized that philosophy too has to advance to a higher degree, that is, that it 
has to transcend into a tool of revolution. 
 
"What does not mean that it vanishes into oblivion. "A definite reconcili-
ationof thought with reality is possibleonly as a final capitulation of revo-
lutionary thought before reactionary reality. A definitive abolition of phi-
losophy is imaginable only as a definitive victory of blind economic forces 
or political violence. Thus it is unimaginable" (Petrović 1966: 327). 
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The worst thing that can happen to philosophy is never to cease existing in its 
endless re-interpretation. Yet Praxists were heavily attacked for not referring 
to the real world and economics, in a sense that neither had they discussed 
capitalism to a certain extent, nor have they analysed changes in the structure, 
and most certainly, that they did not suggest anything practical. Again, the 
truth is of entirely different nature. Firstly, consider Kangrga: 
 
"[...] it is not our intention to, in an attempt of enlightening accentuated 
question, think about it solely in horizon of the political, as it often and 
much often happens, but we want to remain primarily on the foothold of 
questioning, therefore in the dimension of philosophical since ‘we already 
had enough of this politics in philosophy’" (Kangrga 1970: 29). 
 
They were fully aware of the problems they are being accused for, but they 
intentionally insisted on not dealing with them because they did not believe 
that it by any means helps to understand the true cause of the problem, and the 
truly right way to deal with it. It is similar to the bioethical problem of the 
various models of deciding whom to treat or not with limited finances and 
equipment at disposal, without addressing the fundamental problem, which is 
why the framework of health care is such that it is not free and available to all, 
and what causes the framework to operate dysfunctional. Petrović expands on 
the problem: 
 
"Can revolution win? Is it not that ‘victory' means the end of the revolu-
tion, and therefore its defeat? What can follow after the revolution, if not 
contra-revolution? Isn't it so that the only real victory of revolution is if it 
carries on? But can a revolution continue forever? Isn't revolution the exact 
opposite of that which continues to last and keeps on repeating?" (Petrović, 
1986b: 261). 
 
The "revolution that carries on", and is "the exact opposite of continuation", is 
the Aufhebung that cannot occur in the structure, via programmatic work. It 
cannot be carried out by plans and programs and campaigns because they are 
pure manifestations of the Is-System, a system which prevents any revolution 
in the first place. 
 
"Marx knew that the new society could not be created simply apart from 
the existing class society, and he also knew that an attempt to know this 
society without the help of Hegelian heritage must remain under the level 
of Hegel. But he also thought that the future society could not be deduced 
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logically from the existing one, that it can be created only through a jump, 
a break, a revolution" (Petrović 1968: 337). 
 
But only in a human being can a revolution genuinely occur, by spontaneity, 
because then it becomes substantial. Žitko, for example, objected Petrović for 
promoting "authentic socialism" while the true Yugoslavian socialism disinte-
grated into a free market (Žitko 2015: 153). The factum gives us the opposite: 
in a state of decay, what you truly need is an authentically free human being 
able to propose a radical suggestion. The fact that socialism disintegrated into 
the free market is precisely the reason why Petrović had to promote authentic 
socialism. Had it been any other way, it would only confirm the failure. 
 
"One free personality (or several of them) cannot transform an unfree so-
ciety into a free one. In a transformative striving, a free personality has a 
success as much as manages to convince, thrill, and move potentially rev-
olutionary social groups to work" (Petrović 1986b: 150-151). 
 
Praxists understood that the whole problem was summed in "Soyons réalistes, 
demandons l'impossible!". It was an outcry against realism, against "pro-
grams" and "campaigns" and "plans". The revolution that occurs with the idea 
of un-grounding, however, posits the self into the u-topos, beyond the real and 
probable, in order to create the truth that is yet to become. It is the possibility 
that in the act of free choice a human being seizes in accordance with her es-
sence which is understood as possible through the observation of spontaneity.29 
Kangrga understood well that such critique must always be "frantic", for it 
aspires to the existence in accordance to not-yet-true (cf. Kangrga 1970: 42; 
also 31, 32). Whoever believes that revolution, as a concept, can be socially 
grounded in the current state of human affairs will ultimately face a personal 
disappointment, which is why praxis philosophy introduced a more concrete 
idea. Concreteness does not lie in writing revolutionary programs, it lies in 
challenging the truth of the self as being an alienated human, subdued freedom. 
In such situation, there are no instructions and no rules. We are left with 
nothing but the speculative thought. Speculative thought as Praxists under-
stood it is not a phantasmagorical imagination or a funny picturing, it is the 
 
29
  Spontaneity is the key to starting the revolution. "The real revolutionary media during 
May were the walls and their speech, the silk-screen posters and the hand-painted no-
tices, the street where speech began and was exchanged – everything that was an imme-
diate inscription, given and returned, spoken and answered, mobile in the same space 
and time, reciprocal and antagonistic" (Baudrillard 2007). 
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humane radical critical apparatus which initiates with Sollen, it is the power of 
human mind to create out of nothing, to boldly seek horizons yet investigated. 
It originates and grows within history, but it confronts history in repulsion to 
alienation and enslavement by turning us into Historical happening. It is com-
ing from a single human being, but it is considering the totality of existence. 
As such, speculative thought opens a path to utopian endeavours, their point 
being not to live an eternity, but to achieve meaningful orientation. 
 
 
6. Concluding thought 
 
The legacy of praxis philosophy is the legacy of speculative thought trans-
cending history since Ancient Greece, echoing over generations as an untame-
able blare of defiance which finds individuals who boldly walk against their 
fate, who refuse to be "officers of the state". Precisely because we are History, 
what was revealed in praxis philosophy is always an actuality – for an individ-
ual, for a group, or for a nation, in one form or the other – as long as it is 
infused with the bravery of speculative thought, one will find praxis philoso-
phy roaring to motivate to being praxis of the world. 
Praxists were not merely a historical footnote, and that is visible from the 
subtle ways in which they constructed their theory of revolution. They were a 
temporality which opened to possibilities clutching beyond the historical con-
text in which they emerged. In a severely alienated world going towards its 
final confirmation of its predefined state,30 they rode the wave of such a pos-
sibility, honestly tried to understand it, and in doing so they pointed towards 
the only thing that can save us – towards a human being, the purity of its form: 
here you are, the shaper of worlds, the utopian messiah: do not forget that! 
Thus, the proponents of praxis thought should not allow sterile criticism to 
appear as if it can make a good point. Without a response, their superficial, 
contorted reading of praxis philosophy may have devastating effects on the 
long run, and then the praxis philosophy may genuinely be degraded to the 
level of a footnote in the history of philosophy. 
 
 
30
  Cf. "The world has lost its capacity to 'form a world' [faire monde]: it seems only to 
have gained that capacity of proliferating, to the extent of its means, the 'unworld' [im-
monde], which, until now, and whatever one may think of retrospective illusions, has 
never in history impacted the totality of the orb to such an extent. In the end, everything 
takes place as if the world affected and permeated itself with a death drive that soon 
would have nothing else to destroy than the world itself" (Nancy 2007: 34). 
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